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ABSTRACT 
This article considers the impact of new media on freedom of expression and media 
freedom within the context of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence. Through comparative analysis of 
United States jurisprudence and scholarship this article deals with the following three 
issues. Firstly, it explores the traditional purpose of the media, and how media freedom, 
as opposed to freedom of expression, has been subject to privileged protection, within 
a ECHR context at least. Secondly, it considers the emergence of new media, and how 
it can be differentiated from the traditional media. Finally, it analyses the philosophical 
justifications for freedom of expression, and how they enable a workable definition of 
the media based upon the concept of the media-as-a-constitutional-component. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The media landscape is undergoing profound change, on an unprecedented scale and at 
an exponential pace, at the forefront of which, is new media1. This communication 
revolution has been recognised within a variety of international arenas by, for instance, 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC)2 and the President of the UN 
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1 P. Coe, ‘The social media paradox: an intersection with freedom of expression and the criminal law’, 
Information & Communications Technology Law, (2015), Vol. 24, Issue 1, 16-40, 16. 
2  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34: Freedoms of opinion and expression, 
CCPR/C/GC/34 (GC 34) 12th September 2011, [15]; See also, O’Flaherty, ‘Freedom of Expression: 
Article 19 of the ICCPR and Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 34’, (2012) 12 Human 
Rights Law Review 627. 
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General Assembly3. Further, in early 2014, the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Communications Report on Media Plurality recognised the increasingly important role 
that new media is playing within society4. These views have been mirrored in the 
United States (US), where the influence of, specifically, social media was summed up 
in New York v Harris: ‘The reality of today’s world is that social media, whether it be 
Twitter, Facebook, Pinterest, Google+ or any other site, is the way people 
communicate’5.  
New media has changed the way in which we communicate, giving rise to a 
culture of sharing and voluntariness6. Thus, it has created a new layer through which 
people organise their lives that, in turn, influences how individuals, communities and 
society interact, in a world where online and offline life is increasingly converging7. 
Yet, despite the accepted impact of new media on the way in which expression is 
communicated and received, Lord Justice Leveson devoted only ten of two thousand 
pages of his Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press to internet 
publications8. This is surprising, bearing in mind the reach of new media, and how its 
use compares to traditional media, in particular the press industry9. Indeed, in his 
Inquiry, Leveson LJ makes reference to the ability of new media, and specifically blogs 
and social networking sites, to reach vast amounts of people10.  He also states that the 
internet is an: ‘ethical vacuum…[that] does not claim to operate by express ethical 
standards, so that bloggers and others may, if they choose, act with impunity.’11 
Specifically, the Inquiry recognises that:  ‘[b]logs and other such websites are entirely 
                                                             
3 UN Highlights Role of Press Freedom as Catalyst for Social and Political Change, UN News Centre, 
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4 House of Lords Select Committee on Communications 1st Report of Session 2013-14, Media Plurality, 
4th February 2014, [46]-[52]. 
5 New York v Harris, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1871 *3, note 3 (Crim. Ct. City of N.Y., N.Y. County, 
2012). 
6  D.R. Stewart (ed), Social Media and the Law, (Routledge, 2013), viii; C. Shirky, Here Comes 
Everybody, (Allen Lane, 2008), 17. 
7 J. Van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity A Critical History of Social Media, (Oxford University Press, 
2013),, 4. 
8 Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, November 2012, 
168-177; 736-737. The Inquiry refers to: ‘…blogs, online news aggregators, publishers, social network 
sites and online hosts’ [4.1]. 
9 Coe, above n 1, 21-24. 
10 In relation to blogs, Leveson LJ refers to Guido Fawkes that, according to its founder, Paul Staines, 
can, when big stories are being broken, be visited by up to 100,000 people per hour.  The Inquiry also 
makes specific reference to the usage of social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter. See Leveson 
Inquiry, above n 8, 168, [4.3]-[4.4], 173, [5.2] respectively. 
11 ibid. 736, [3.2]. 
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unregulated’12 and that other new media companies, including social networking sites 
operate under different national laws, depending on where they are domiciled13. 
 This article investigates the impact of new media on freedom of expression and 
media freedom within the context of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence. With recourse 
to comparative analysis of scholarship and jurisprudence from the US, as well as 
jurisdictions such as New Zealand, this article offers a method for distinguishing media 
from non-media actors; therefore, identifying the beneficiaries of the right to media 
freedom. Moreover, it aims to provide a definition of media within a new media 
landscape.  
This article begins, at section two, by distinguishing media freedom from 
freedom of expression. It establishes that the former provides enhanced protection, over 
and above the right to freedom of expression, for actors operating as part of the media. 
This leads on to a discussion, at section three, of the changing media landscape, the rise 
of new media and the emergence of citizen journalism. It considers the wider societal 
impact of this new breed of journalism, and the role it plays in facilitating public 
discourse.  
The enhanced media freedom protection afforded to media actors within this 
new media landscape is the same regardless of whether the actor is operating as part of 
the traditional or new media. The issue is who, or what, can be classed as media, and 
therefore benefit from this protection. Section four argues that, in the context of new 
media and citizen journalism, the traditional approaches for distinguishing media from 
non-media actors at best lack merit, and are, at worst, redundant. Thus, through analysis 
of the philosophical foundations of freedom of expression, a new media-as-a-
constitutional-component concept is advanced at section five. This concept is based on 
the premise that the performance of a constitutional function, rather than the education, 
training or employment of the actor, should define the beneficiaries of media freedom. 
Finally, drawing on the prevailing sections, and with reference to a public interest 
                                                             
12 ibid. 171, [4.20]. Leveson LJ does acknowledge that the Huffington Post UK is unique in having (at 
the time) voluntarily subscribed to the Press Complaints Commission and abided by the Editors’ Code 
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13 ibid. 174-177. 
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requirement, this article concludes at section six by offering a new workable definition 
of the media. 
2. MEDIA FREEDOM 
DISTINGUISHING MEDIA FREEDOM FROM FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The traditional professional media, including the printed press, television, radio and 
film industry, continues to benefit from significant protection beyond that afforded to 
private individuals and non-media organisations. This position is evident within a 
number of jurisdictions. For example, pursuant to Article 11(2) of the Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU): ‘freedom and pluralism of the media 
shall be respected’. In Germany, Article 5(1)2 of the German Basic Law provides a separate 
provision for the specific protection of media expression, thus creating a clear distinction with 
free expression guarantees for private individuals: ‘[f]reedom of the press and freedom of 
reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed’14. Similarly, in the US, the 
First Amendment states that: ‘[c]ongress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press…’15. Within a ECHR context, freedom of expression is protected by Article 
10(1), and qualified by Article 10(2). 
Although Article 10(1) does not specifically provide for protection of media 
freedom in distinction to that of private individuals and non-media institutions, in 
interpreting Article 10, the ECtHR has attached great importance to the role of the 
media16. Accordingly, the media’s contribution to democracy and democratic self-
governance17, and its ‘role of public watchdog’18 have been clearly established by the 
jurisprudence of the Court. Indeed, it recognises a duty on the media to convey 
                                                             
14 See generally: J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) 
JML 57-78, 59; E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2005), 417-419. 
15 However, despite a specific free press clause, the US position is very different, and is discussed below. 
16 For example, see: Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 125, [59]; Bergens Tidande 
v Norway (2001) 31 EHRR 16, [48]; Busuioc v Moldova (2006) 42 EHRR 14, [64]-[65]; Jersild v 
Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1; Janowski v Poland (No 1) (2000) 29 EHRR 705, [32]. 
17 For example, see: Perna v Italy (2004) 39 EHRR 28. 
18 The Observer and The Guardian v United Kingdom (1991) 14 EHRR 153, [59]; Goodwin v United 
Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123, [39]; Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843, [63]; Bladet Tromso 
and Stensaas v Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 125, [62]. 
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information and ideas on political issues and public interest19, and the right of the public 
to receive this information20. 
 The special position of the media in relation to freedom of expression, 
recognised by commentators such as Stewart J, Bezanson and West21, explains why the 
jurisprudence of, for instance, the ECtHR, interprets Article 10(1) to contain privileged 
protection of the media, even in the absence of express provisions to that effect. Media 
freedom is, therefore, special because, when a media actor is working toward a 
publication, they are subject to greater protection compared to that offered to non-media 
actors by freedom of expression. Thus, the fact that a statement can be classed as media 
expression, as opposed to expression by a private individual or non-media institution, 
adds to the burden of justifying its restrictions22. 
 In Vejdeland and others v Sweden23 the applicants, who were not associated 
with the media, had been convicted for distributing homophobic leaflets in a secondary 
school. The ECtHR upheld the convictions, whilst observing: ‘[i]f exactly the same 
words and phrases were to be used in public newspapers…they would probably not be 
considered a matter for criminal prosecution and condemnation’24. Thus, the special 
protection afforded to media expression permits the use of a wide discretion as to the 
methods and techniques adopted to report on matters, and how that material is 
subsequently presented25. It allows the media to have recourse to exaggeration and even 
provocation26 , including the use of strong terminology or polemic formulations27 . 
Additionally, the ECtHR has held that this protection extends beyond the dissemination 
                                                             
19 Lingens v Austria (186) 8 EHRR 103, [26]; Oberschlick v Austria (No 1) (1991) 19 EHRR 389, [58]; 
Castells v Spain (1992) 14 EHRR 445, [43]; Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843; 
Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1, [31]. 
20 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245, [65]; Fressoz and Roire v France (2001) 31 
EHRR 2, [51]; Bergens Tidande v Norway (2001) 31 EHRR 16, [52]. 
21 P. Stewart J, ‘Or of the Press’, (1975) 26 Hastings Law Journal 631, 633; R.P. Bezanson, ‘The New 
Free Press Guarantee’ (1977) 63 Virginia Law Review 731, 733; S.R. West, ‘Awakening the Press 
Clause’ (2011) 58 UCLA Law Review 1025, 1032. The US position is discussed in more detail below. 
22 Oster above n 14, 59. 
23 [2012] ECHR 242. 
24 [2012] ECHR 242 per Judge Vucancic at [12]. 
25 Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1, [31]; Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 
125, [63]; Bergens Tidande v Norway (2001) 31 EHRR 16, [57]. 
26 Prager and Oberschlick v Austria (1995) 21 EHRR 1, [38]; Thoma v Luxembourg (2003) 36 EHRR 
21, [45]-[46]; R. Clayton QC and H. Tomlinson QC, Privacy and Freedom of Expression (2nd ed. Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 271 [15.254]. 
27 Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843, [67]; Oberschlick v Austria (No 2) (1998) 25 
EHRR 357, [33]; Oster above n 14, 59. 
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of the journalist’s or media organisation’s own opinions, to encapsulate those expressed 
by third parties in the context of, for example, interviews28.  
 The ambit of media freedom is not limited to stronger protection for media 
publications; instead, it extends to rights that are not, in any way, available pursuant to 
freedom of expression guarantees. Consequently, media freedom and freedom of 
expression differ in relation to the intensity of the protection and in respect of the scope 
of the protected action. This position equates to institutional protection of the media 
that, sequentially, guarantees rights that are not exclusively concerned with expression, 
but also relate to the media vis-a-vis its newsgathering or editorial activities, or even to 
the existence of an independent media29.  
Oster categorises the right to media freedom as being both defensive, in that it 
protects the media against interference, such as state action, and positive, as it entitles 
the media to state protection30. This categorisation is animated by reference to a non-
exhaustive list of ECtHR jurisprudence31. For instance, in relation to the defensive 
category, in Halis Dogan and others v Turkey, the Court held that media freedom 
includes the protection of the newspaper distribution infrastructure32. The case of Gsell 
v Switzerland33 involved restrictions on road access to the World Economic Forum in 
Davos. Consequently, the Court recognised the existence of protection against state 
measures that could impinge upon the exercise of the journalist’s profession. It has also 
been held that journalists cannot be made to give evidence concerning confidential 
information or sources, even if it has been obtained illegally34. They are also exempt 
from certain data protection and copyright provisions35. With regard to the positive 
category, states are required to: protect the media through the safeguarding of media 
                                                             
28 Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1. 
29 Oster above n 14, 60. 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid. 60-61. 
32 Halis Dogan and others v Turkey Application no. 50693/99 (ECtHR, 10th January 2006), [24] 
33 [2009] ECHR 1465. 
34 Goodwin v United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 16, [39]; Radio Twist as v Slovakia [2006] ECHR 1129, 
[62]; Sanoma Uitgevers BV v Netherlands [2010] ECHR 1273, [50]. 
35 For example, see: Article 9 Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L281/31; Article 5(3)(c) Copyright 
Directive 2001/29/EC, OJ L167/19. 
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pluralism36; protect journalists from acts of violence in the course of their work37, and 
from undue influence by financially powerful groups38 or the government39.  
In contrast to ECtHR jurisprudence, the position in the US is markedly different. 
Despite commentators40, and dissenting Supreme Court judgments41, arguing that the 
free press clause ‘or of the press’ in the First Amendment to the US Constitution creates 
a similar distinction to that provided by the CFREU, the German Basic Law and the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, this has been opposed by academics such as Volokh42, and 
resisted by the Supreme Court43. Consequently, the dominant view in the US is based 
on the press-as-technology model. This model has roots in English common law44, and 
is founded on the premise that media freedom should not be subject to privileges or 
duties over and above freedom of expression45.  According to Volokh, freedom of the 
press is technological. It is, therefore, available to all forms of communication classed 
as technologies, which covers everything46. In Volokh’s assessment, freedom of the 
press does not just protect the press industry, but secures the right of everyone to use 
communications technology47. Therefore, the ambit of the model extends to, not only 
                                                             
36 Informationsverein Lentia and others v Austria [1993] ECHR 57, [32]-[34]; TV Vest & Rogaland 
Pensjonistparti v Norway [2008] ECHR 1687, [78]. 
37 Ozgur Gundem v Turkey [2000] ECHR 104, [38 ff]. 
38 Article 21(4)(2) EC Merger Regulation 139/2004, OJ L24/1; Part 5 Chapter 2 Communications Act 
2003 ch 21. 
39 Manole v Moldova [2009] ECHR 1292, [109]; Centro Europa 7 Srl and Di Stefano v Italy App no 
38433/09 (ECtHR, 7th June 2012), [133]. 
40 See generally: M.B. Nimmer, ‘Introduction – Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it 
Add to Freedom of Speech?’ (1975) 26 Hastings Law Journal 631; C.E. Baker, Human Liberty and 
Freedom of Speech, (Oxford University Press, 1989), chs. 10-11; R.P. Bezanson, ‘Whither Freedom of 
the Press?’ (2012) 97 Iowa Law Review 1259; See also: T.B. Dyk, ‘Newsgathering, Press Access, and 
the First Amendment’, (1992) 44 Stanford Law Review 927, 931-932; P. Horwitz, ‘Universities as First 
Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard Questions’, (2007) 54 UCLA Law Review, 1497, 
1505; West, above n 21, 1027-1029; For judicial argument see: Stewart J, above n 21, 634 
41 See the dissenting judgments of: Stevens J in Citizens United v FEC 130 S Ct 876, 951 n 57 (2010); 
Powell J in Saxbe v Wash Post Co 417 US 843, 863 (1974); Douglas J Branzburg v Hayes 408 US 665, 
721 (1972) . 
42 E. Volokh, ‘Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to 
Today’, (2012) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 459. 
43 See the majority decision in Citizens United v FEC 130 S Ct, 905; See also: ibid. (Volokh) 506-510 
for a summary of other Supreme Court cases that have held the same. 
44 R v Shipley (Dean of Saint Asaph’s Case) (1784) 21 How. St. Tr. 847 (KB); R v Rowan (1794) 22 
How. St .Tr. 1033 (KB); R v Burdett (1820) 106 Eng. Rep. 873 (KB), 887; 4 B. & Ald. 95, 132; see 
generally: ibid. (Volokh) 484-489. 
45 For example, see: D.L. Lange, ‘The Speech and Press Clauses’ (1975) 23 UCLA Law Review 77; WW 
van Alstyne, ‘the Hazards to the Press of Claiming a “Preferred Position” (1977) 28 Hastings Law 
Journal 761, 768-669; A. Lewis, ‘A Preferred Position for Journalism’ (1978-9) 7 Hofstra Law Review 
595; C.E. Baker ‘Press Performance, Human Rights, and Private Power as a Threat’ (2011) 5 Law & 
Ethics of Human Rights 219, 230; ibid. (Volokh) 538-539. 
46 Bezanson, above n 40. 
47 Volokh, above n 42, 462-463. 
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the traditional media, and professional journalists utilising new media, but also to un-
trained citizen journalists, who communicate via mediums such as Facebook, 
Instagram, Twitter and YouTube.  
This originalist interpretation 48  is prevalent in US jurisprudence and 
scholarship, both historically49 and currently. Despite the Supreme Court recognising 
that the press operates ‘as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by government 
officials’50, it continues to reject the argument that the institutional press has any 
constitutional privilege in excess of other speakers51. Thus, the majority in Citizens 
United v FEC52, echoing previous judgments of Brennan J53, agreed that the First 
Amendment protects ‘speech’54, as opposed to the source of that expression, whether 
that emanates from a professional journalist or a casual Twitter user55.  
 
 In conclusion, within the context of the ECHR and ECtHR jurisprudence, this 
section has established that the distinction between the freedom of expression right 
afforded to private individuals compared with that of non-media institutions, pursuant 
to media freedom, can be articulated as follows: if the expression emanates from a 
media entity, whether that be a journalist, or a media company, it will be subject to the 
privileged protection set out above; to the contrary, if the expression comes from a non-
media entity, it will, nonetheless, be subject to general freedom of expression 
                                                             
48 See: D. Anderson, ‘The Origins of the Press Clause’ (1982-3) 30 UCLA Law Review 455; Volokh, 
above n 42; D.L. Lange, ‘The Speech and Press Clauses’ (1975) 23 UCLA Law Review 77, 88-99; A. 
Lewis, ‘A Preferred Position for Journalism’ (1978-9) 7 Hofstra Law Review 595, 600; Bezanson, above 
n 40. 
49  Republica v Oswald 1 Dall. 319, 325 (Pa. 1788); Commonwealth v Freeman, HERALD OF 
FREEDOM (Boston), Mar. 18, 1791, at 5 (Mass. 1791); In re Fries. 9 F. Cas. 826, 839 (Justice Iredell, 
Circuit Judge, C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (no. 5126); Runkle v Meyer 3 Yeates 518, 519 (Pa. 1803); see generally: 
Volokh, above n 42, 465-468. 
50 Mills v Alabama 384 US 214, 219 (1966); see also: Estes v Texas 381 US 532, 539 (1965). 
51 Citizens United v FEC 130 S Ct 876, 905 (2010); Associated Press v United States 326 US 1, 7 (1945); 
Branzburg v Hayes 408 US 665, 704 (1972); Pell v Procunier 417 US 817, 834 (1974); Saxbe v 
Washington Post Company 417 US 843, 848-849; In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller 397 F 3d 964 (DC 
Cir 2005), cert denied 125 S Ct 2977 (2005). 
52 130 S Ct 876 (2010). 
53 For example, see: Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 US 749, 781 (1985). 
54 Citizens United v FEC 130 S Ct 876, 905 (2010) (Scalia J concurring). 
55 However, the model is not immune to criticism and opposing views, from both US Supreme Court 
judges, and legal scholars. For example, see generally:  Bartnicki v Vopper 532 US 514 (2001); 
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v Minn. Comm’r of Revenue 460 US 575, 592-93 (1983); Gertz v Robert 
Welch Inc 418 US 323 (1974); see the dissenting judgments in Citizens United v FEC 130 S Ct 876 
(2010) (in particular Stevens J at 951 n. 57); Powell J’s dissenting judgment in Saxbe v Washington Post 
Company 417 US 843, 863 (1974); Douglas J’s dissenting judgment in Branzburg v Hayes 408 US 665, 
721 (1972); Stewart J, above n 21, 634; Dyk, above n 40, 931-932; Horwitz, above n 40, 1505; West, 
above n 21, 1027-1029. See also Bezanson’s rejoinder to Volokh’s article: Bezanson, above n 40.. 
 9 
protection. Furthermore, only journalists and media organisations can take advantage 
of the freedom bestowed upon the media as an institution, for example, with regard to 
newsgathering activities56. 
3. THE TRADITIONAL MEDIA AND THE AGE OF NEW MEDIA 
(A) THE TRADITIONAL MEDIA 
The origins of the traditional media, and in particular the press industry, may well be 
founded on freedom of expression philosophy57, and the notion that, as the Fourth 
Estate, its primary function is to act as a ‘public watchdog’,58 in that it operates as the 
general public’s ‘eyes and ears’ by investigating and reporting abuses of power59. Prior 
to the evolution of the internet into a network available throughout the world and, in 
particular, the new media revolution, which transformed that network into an accessible 
form of mass media, creating an audience and producer convergence60, traditional press 
and broadcast (television or radio) companies were the only media institutions that had 
the ability to reach mass audiences through regular publication or broadcasts 61 . 
Consequently, as observed by Leveson LJ in his Inquiry, in recent years, the traditional 
media, and in particular the press, has played a critical role in informing the public on 
matters of public interest and concern62. Furthermore, because of the traditional media’s 
ability to reach so many people, for the purposes of media protection, it was relatively 
easy to distinguish between expression conveyed by a media entity, to that 
communicated by a private individual63.  
However, in contrast to Leveson LJ’s examples of high quality investigative 
public interest journalism64, there is no doubt that an increasing number of print and 
broadcast media outlets choose to engage with sexy stories that sell, as opposed to 
reporting on matters of public concern65; a position that clearly correlates with the 
                                                             
56 Oster above n 14, 61-62. 
57 See section 5(A) below. 
58 Observer and Guardian v UK (1992) 14 EHRR 153, [59]. 
59 A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 183 per Sir John Donaldson MR; See also: 
Barendt above n 14, 418. 
60 See generally: A. Bruns, Blogs, Wikipedia, Second Life and Beyond: From Production to Produsage, 
(Peter Lang Publishing, 2008). 
61 See generally: Van Dijck, above n 7, 3-23. 
62 Leveson Inquiry, above n 8, 455-470. 
63 Oster above n 14, 62. 
64 Leveson Inquiry, above n 8, 455-470. 
65 Numerous examples are provided by the Leveson Inquiry at 539-591. 
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criticisms advanced below of Holmes J’s marketplace of ideas theory66. Thus, a number 
of commentators have argued that the media’s public watchdog role gradually 
diminished towards the end of the twentieth century. Instead, the focus shifted onto 
commercially viable stories67. Media ownership, and the power derived from it, means 
that there is a constant conflict between the traditional media’s role as a watchdog, or 
gatekeeper, and commercial reality. Indeed, it has been observed that, during the 
twentieth century, there has been a dilution of news media ownership, which is now 
vested in a relatively small number of large and powerful companies. Accordingly, this 
ownership concentration has had a detrimental effect on investigative journalism68. To 
the contrary, citizen journalists, through the use of new media are, in many instances, 
replacing the traditional media as the public’s watchdog. 
(B) THE AGE OF NEW MEDIA 
Until relatively recently, the public were, to a great extent, limited as to what they were 
exposed to reading or seeing, by what large proportions of the traditional media chose 
to publish or broadcast. Such decisions may have come down to editorial control, based 
on, for instance, owner or political bias, commercial revenue, or both, rather than being 
based on the results of sound investigative journalism69. However, the new media 
revolution, which has facilitated the convergence of audience and producer70 , and 
enabled this new breed of citizen journalist to communicate with, potentially, millions 
of people, means that the ability to reach mass audiences is no longer something that is 
monopolised by traditional media institutions and, therefore, cannot be relied upon to 
distinguish between media and non-media entities71. 
                                                             
66 See section 5(C) below. 
67  For example, see: C. Calvert and M. Torres, ‘Putting the Shock Value in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence: When Freedom for the Citizen-Journalist Watchdog Trumps the Right of Informational 
Privacy on the Internet’ (2011) Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 323, 341; J. 
Curran and J. Seaton, Power Without Responsibility – Press, Broadcasting and the Internet in Britain, 
(7th ed. Routledge, 2010), 96-98; E. Cashmore, Celebrity Culture, (2nd ed. Routledge, 2014). 
68  S.L. Carter, ‘Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of Consent’ (1983-1984) Yale Law 
Journal 581, 600-607; P. Garry, ‘The First Amendment and Freedom of the Press: A Revised Approach 
to the Marketplace of Ideas Concept’ (1989) 72 Marquette Law Review 187, 189; See also Leveson LJ’s 
assessment of the commercial pressures on the press: Leveson Inquiry, above n 8, 93-98. 
69 This criticism is advanced by Barendt with regard to the marketplace of ideas theory (dealt with at 
section 5(C) below): Barendt above n 14, 12; See also: N. Davies, Flat Earth News, (Vintage, 2009); C. 
Cook, More Telegraph writers voice concern, 19th February 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-
31529682 accessed 19th May 2015. 
70 See generally: J. Rowbottom, ‘To rant, vent and converse: protecting low level digital speech’, 
(2012) C.L.J. 71(2), 355-383, 365. 
71 Oster above n 14, 63. 
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New media platforms have changed the traditional media landscape forever, as 
they have altered our perceptions of the limits of communication and the reception of 
information. It is no longer the case that communication is constrained by boundaries, 
such as location, time, space or culture 72 , or dictated by a media organisation’s 
ownership, political bias73  or commercial partners74 . Unlimited access to multiple 
outlets and platforms that are instantaneously accessible allows users, forming what 
Benkler refers to as the ‘networked public sphere’75, to transmit and receive information 
to one and other, via platforms, such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and 
Snapchat, without the need to consider the boundaries and restrictions mentioned 
above76. This is illustrated by using statistics to compare the use of new media with 
traditional media. For example, the New York Times 2013 print and digital circulation 
was approximately two million77, enabling it to proclaim that it was the ‘#1 individual 
newspaper site’ on the internet, with nearly thirty-one million unique visitors per 
month78. In contrast, YouTube, which is owned by Google, has one billion unique 
visitors per month79 which, according to Ammori, equates to: ‘thirty times more than 
the New York Times, or as many unique visitors in a day as the [New York] Times has 
every month’80. According to WordPress’ statistics, it hosts blogs written in over 120 
languages, equating to over 409 million users viewing more than 15.5 billion pages 
each month. Consequently, users produce approximately 41.7 million new posts and 
60.5 million new comments on a monthly basis81. As of December 2015, Twitter states 
that it has 320 million active users82 and normally ‘takes in’ approximately 500 million 
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75 Y. Benkler, The Wealth of Networks (Yale University Press, 2006), 212. 
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81 https://wordpress.com/about/accessed 17th March 2016. 
82 https://about.twitter.com/company accessed 17th March 2016. 
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Tweets per day, equating to an average of 5,700 Tweets per second83. It has more 
visitors per week than the New York Times does in a month84. Similarly, Tumblr hosts 
over 170 million microblogs85 and, with 300 million visits per month, enjoys ten times 
more than the New York Times86. According to Facebook, as of December 2015, it had 
1.59 billion monthly active users, 934 million of which use their mobile applications to 
access the platform on a daily basis87. Late 2013 saw Instagram’s global usage expand 
by 15%, in just two months, to 150 million people88. Latest figures show that this has 
now increased to 400 million89. LinkedIn’s current membership exceeds 400 million90. 
These established platforms are only the tip of the new media iceberg. Pinterest 
continues to grow rapidly 91 , as do emerging platforms, such as Snapchat and 
WhatsApp92 . Consequently, for many people, new media platforms have not just 
replaced the written word; they have become a substitute for the spoken word93. 
This reach of new media amplifies the way that the media, in general, envelopes 
our existence. Traditional media organisations no longer monopolise the news-
gathering, communication or reception process, or indeed how we express emotions, 
opinions and ideas. Consequently, new media has become an increasingly important 
source of news94 and both formal and informal method of communication. In light of 
the economic plight of the traditional media, citizen journalism is in the ascendance. 
This new breed of ‘journalist’ is increasingly playing the role of public watchdog, and 
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aiding democratic participation95. As Cram observes, new media has: ‘…transformed the 
average citizen’s hitherto largely passive experience of political debate led by elite opinion 
formers into something much more vibrant and more participative’96. Other scholars, who have 
made this democratisation argument97, have emphasised the empowerment98 of what Volokh 
has referred to as ‘cheap speech’: ‘The new technologies…will, I believe, both democratize the 
information marketplace – make it more accessible to comparitively poor speakers as well as 
the rich ones – and diversify it’99. This ability of new media to create a democratised digital 
public sphere has also been acknowledged by the US Supreme Court in Reno v ACLU100, in 
which Justice Stevens stated that online chatrooms would enable anyone to become a ‘town 
crier with a voice that resonates further than it would from a soap box’101. More recently, the 
Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers has stated: 
‘Citizens’ communication and interaction in online environments and their 
participation in activities that involve matters of public interest can bring positive, 
real-life, social change. When freedom of expression and the right to receive and 
impart information and freedom of assembly are not upheld online, their 
protection offline is likely to be undermined and democracy and the rule of law 
can also be compromised’102 
By enriching public discourse through the reporting of matters of public interest 
and concern 103  new media is a paradigm of the argument from democratic self-
governance104.  For example, the death of Osama Bin Laden was leaked on Twitter, 
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before being published by any newspaper105. Edward Snowden disclosed information 
regarding American surveillance programmes to blogger Glenn Greenwald, as he did 
not trust the New York Times to publish the material106. Syria’s President, Bashar al-
Assad, and his opposing rebels have distributed competing propaganda via 
Instagram 107 . Chelsea Manning, the US soldier convicted in 2013 for, inter alia, 
offences pursuant to the Espionage Act, leaked classified documents to WikiLeaks, as 
opposed to a traditional media outlet108. As a result of the importance attributed to 
citizen journalism, this new breed of journalist has even gained official recognition as 
press109. Incidentally, traditional media companies are now, largely, operating online 
outlets in addition to their staple method of communication110, whilst companies such 
as the Huffington Post, which may be classed as traditional professional media, operate 
exclusively online111. 
 
Never before has a form of media changed the scale, pace or pattern of human 
affairs to such an extent, within such a short period of time. However, although new 
media platforms are now a vital, and often the preferred method of imparting and 
receiving news112, its contribution to matters of public interest cannot be overrated, just 
as traditional journalism should not be underestimated113. This is because new media 
facilitates the instantaneous, and often spontaneous, expression of opinions and venting 
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and sharing of emotions, thoughts and feelings 114 . Consequently, the internet is 
saturated with poorly researched, biased and meaningless material. For instance, in his 
Inquiry, Leveson LJ refers to Popbitch that, in his Lordship’s opinion, is: ‘clear in its 
ambition to entertain and understands itself to “poke fun” and comment on the “lighter” 
side of celebrity culture’115.  
 
Despite the best intentions of some serious citizen journalists, they may still 
lack the education, qualifications and experience to distinguish themselves from 
professional journalists. Indeed, bloggers post information despite being uncertain as 
to its provenance and without verifying it for reliability, and instead, rely on readers to 
judge its accuracy116. To the contrary, a blog by a professional journalist may include 
spontaneous comments and conversation, whilst being supported by professional 
experience and resources117. Although John Stuart Mill’s argument from truth is not 
concerned with these issues, the criticisms levelled at the theory later in this article 
clearly apply118. Furthermore, these concerns are paradigm examples of the rejoinders 
raised in relation to Holmes J’s marketplace of ideas119 . There exists a symbiosis 
between citizen journalism and the traditional media that has been articulated by a 
number of commentators. Essentially, this relationship is mutually beneficial because 
professional journalists and traditional media entities research and cover the findings 
of citizen journalism that, sequentially, adds credence to the citizen journalist’s work 
and facilitates the wider dissemination of their research120. 
 
4 TRADITIONAL APPROACHES FOR DETERMINING THE BENEFICIARIES 
OF ‘MEDIA FREEDOM’  
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Traditionally courts and scholars from different jurisdictions have used the following 
approaches to determine whom and what should benefit from the existence of a distinct 
right to media freedom: the press-as-technology model; the mass audience approach 
and; the professionalised publisher approach 121 . New media’s creation of citizen 
journalism means that the ability to reach mass audiences is no longer the preserve of 
traditional media actors. This blurring of the lines between our perceptions of the 
traditional media and citizen journalists has created doctrinal uncertainty as to how the 
courts should determine the beneficiaries of media freedom. Arguably, in the context 
of new media, these approaches can no longer be relied upon to distinguish between 
media and non-media actors. As a result, this section will argue that although these 
approaches may once have been effective, they now lack merit and are, potentially, 
redundant.  
 
(A) PRESS-AS-TECHNOLOGY MODEL 
 
The dominant view in the US, based upon the press-as-technology model, is that the 
media should not be subject to any privileges or special duties122. Accordingly, there is 
no need to distinguish it at all and, as a result, this model does not provide the means to 
do so. This is because, so the press-as-technology movement argues, the Framers of the 
Constitution understood the words ‘or of the press’ to secure the right of every person 
to use communications technology, as opposed to laying down a right exclusively 
available to members of the publishing industry123. As a result, in the view of the 
Supreme Court, the First Amendment protects speech not speakers, regardless of 
whether the source of the expression is a professional journalist or media organisation, 
or whether it’s a casual social media user124. Therefore, in the case of Branzburg v 
Hayes 125 , White J, giving the opinion of the majority, resisted attempting to 
conceptualise the media, and define what it consists of. In White J’s judgment, this is 
because: ‘freedom of the press is a fundamental personal right’ which is not confined 
to the mass media but, instead, attaches to ‘every sort of publication which affords a 
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vehicle of information and opinion’126. Thus, there appears a concern, echoed, although 
not necessarily supported, in the work of scholars such as Oster, Baker and Amar that, 
in attempting to define the media, there is a risk of creating either an over-inclusive or 
over-exclusive interpretation of journalism 127 . The former could, potentially, be 
misused128, while the latter could give rise to allegations of discrimination129. This is 
because non-journalists, who regularly contribute to matters of public importance, such 
as business leaders, scientists and artists, would not fall within the province of the 
additional protection afforded to the media 130 . However, this argument is largely 
without merit. Protecting the media with specific provisions or clauses, that provide 
extra privileges and duties, does not mean those who are not part of the institutional 
press would be deprived of their rights. For instance, within the context of ECtHR 
jurisprudence, artistic131 and commercial expression132 are subject to a relatively high 
level of protection. Similarly, Article 13 CFREU, and Article 5(3) of the German Basic 
Law protect freedom of science and freedom of the arts. Thus, there is no reason to 
suggest that, within these legal frameworks at least, privileged protection of the media 
would operate against business leaders, artists or scientists133.  
 
In addition to this argument, there are wider-reaching reasons why the press-as-
technology model, and the resistance to defining the media and delineating between 
those who are subject to a right to media freedom over and above those that are simply 
entitled to the right to freedom of expression, are subject to criticism. In fact, there is a 
strong judicial and academic counter-movement in the US that not only correlates more 
closely with ECtHR jurisprudence, but also undermines the model within the new 
media era.  
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The specific media protection clauses enshrined within legal instruments, such 
as Article 11(2) CFREU and the First Amendment, in addition to those provisions 
safeguarding freedom of expression134, strongly suggest that, for example, the EU and 
the Framers of the US Constitution, intended to distinguish the two, in that they could 
apply to different entities and mean something different. Taking the First Amendment 
as an example, scholars have argued that these provisions must mean something more 
otherwise they would be redundant135. For Stewart J, the First Amendment free press 
clause operates as a structural guarantee to enable the press to fulfil its constitutional 
functions of acting as the Fourth Estate; to provide additional checks and balances on 
the government. Accordingly, the twin speech and press rights are: ‘no constitutional 
accident, but an acknowledgment of the critical role played by the press…’136 Further, 
according to West, in addition to the Fourth Estate function, the press fulfils another 
primary role beyond the values served by the general right to freedom of expression: 
dissemination of information of public interest137.  
 
In today’s new media era, clearly the institutional press is not the only means to 
provide a check and balance on government, or convey matters of public interest. Other 
forms of media can, and do, fulfil this role effectively138. Consequently, these views of 
the press clause are not exclusively institutional139. The functions of the press identified 
by Stewart J and West, as being conducive to its constitutional role, continue to be 
served by a variety of traditional and new media140. Therefore, when constitutions, 
statutes and normative theory require protection of the media in addition to freedom of 
expression, it is incumbent on the courts to delineate between the two, as demonstrated 
by ECtHR jurisprudence, despite the fact that such a challenging line-drawing exercise 
will generate controversial judgments 141 . Accepting the media as a discrete legal 
institution142 is vitally important within a new media era, in which we can be constantly 
bombarded by a cacophony of information from different forms of media. It is the 
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fulfilment of the unique functions identified by Stewart J and West that serve to 
distinguish the media-as-a-constitutional-component 143  from mere media 
entertainment, as the activities of the latter are not subject to the same legal 
protection144, at least within an ECtHR and CFREU context.  
 
(B) MASS AUDIENCE APPROACH  
According to the UNHRC, anyone with the ability to disseminate information to a mass 
audience could be considered to be media, and therefore be subject to the same 
privileges145. Historically this approach could have enabled a distinction to be made 
between media and non-media actors as professional journalists, and the newspapers, 
publishers and broadcasters they worked for, tended to be the only entities with the 
ability to reach mass audiences. However, new media’s creation of citizen journalists 
means that this ability is no longer the preserve of these organisations and their 
journalists or broadcasters. Instead, anybody with access to the internet can, 
theoretically, convey information to millions of people through a multitude of 
platforms. If you consider the reach of sporting celebrities such as Cristiano Ronaldo, 
Andy Murray and Lewis Hamilton through their social media accounts, based on the 
UNHRC’s formulation, they would be considered journalists146.  
This situation is paradigmatic of the over-inclusive interpretation of media 
expression147, as it captures virtually every internet publication, including, for instance, 
tweets by celebrity footballers.  Furthermore,, clearly the appearance and quality of 
information available on the internet, and via social media, varies drastically148. Despite 
these inconsistencies, the mass audience approach would classify a casual tweet from 
Cristiano Ronaldo as being legally indistinguishable to a citizen journalist using their 
blog to report from a war zone. Therefore, it would be incorrect to classify all 
publications capable of reaching mass audiences as media: the internet, as a vehicle 
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through which information can be conveyed, must not be confused with the media as a 
legal concept, just as the medium paper does not, necessarily, constitute the press149. 
Consequently, it is imperative to identify diligent journalists operating within the 
media-as-a-constitutional-component, regardless of the form that takes, and distinguish 
these from media entertainment and other information. 
 
(C) ‘PROFESSIONALISED’ PUBLISHER APPROACH 
  
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR regularly refer to ‘media professionals’150. Thus, in cases such as Perrin v UK151 
and Willem v France 152  the ECtHR did not grant protection to private and non-
professional internet publications. This view is mirrored in the US in that, for example, 
under New York shield law, only ‘professional journalists’ working for ‘gain or 
livelihood’153 are entitled to benefit from special journalistic dispensations154. These 
positions lend support to an approach whereby a publisher must be connected with, and 
remunerated by, a traditional media company, and/or have undertaken formal 
journalistic education and training to benefit from privileges attributed to media 
freedom.  
 
 In contrast to the mass audience approach, this approach animates concerns of 
over-exclusivity155, for reasons that are relevant within the context of new media. 
Firstly, who amounts to a professional journalist cannot be defined by membership of 
a professional body, as unlike lawyers and doctors, journalists are not required to be 
members of such organisations. Secondly, just because a person has not undergone 
formal journalistic education or training does not mean they cannot be diligent and 
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professional reporters. Equally, requiring that a person be employed by a professional 
media organisation eliminates anyone not subject to regular remuneration. This would 
include freelancers, bloggers and social media commentators, despite the fact their 
work may contribute to matters of public interest156. 
 
 The ‘professionalised’ publisher approach is unconvincing when considering 
that private blogs can be the only source of news coverage from, for example, war 
zones, as was the case during the Arab Spring uprising157. In contrast, educated and 
professionally trained journalists, employed by media organisations, do not always 
write or broadcast material that is in the public interest158. Instead, this work may be 
subject to conflicting interests, such as commercialism 159 . Thus, establishing a 
presumption that a tabloid journalist reporting on a kiss-and-tell story should be subject 
to greater legal protection, under the auspices of media freedom, than a private citizen 
journalist diligently blogging from an area embroiled in conflict, merely because the 
former is remunerated by a media organisation, and is professionally trained and 
educated is unmeritorious and illogical160. The former could be classed as mere media 





5 THE MEDIA-AS-A-CONSTITUTIONAL-COMPONENT 
The previous section has established the shortfalls of the traditional methods adopted 
by courts and scholars for distinguishing between media and non-media actors: they 
simply do not fit in the new media arena. Based on a combination of jurisprudence and 
scholarship, and by recourse to the philosophical rationales underpinning freedom of 
expression and the media, this section will attempt to formulate a functional media-as-
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a-constitutional-component approach that, theoretically and normatively, justifies the 
media as a distinct legal institution. It will argue that the performance of a constitutional 
function should define the beneficiaries of media freedom, as opposed to the individual 
being defined as media, simply based upon their employment or training.  Ultimately, 
it seeks to establish the egalitarian principle that media freedom, and its privileges, 
attach to the constitutional component, and could therefore apply to anyone serving a 
constitutional function: that is, operating as the Fourth Estate and/or disseminating 
information of public interest to an audience.  
(A) FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION JUSTIFICATIONS AND THEIR APPLICATION 
TO MEDIA FREEDOM 
Justification for the protection of freedom of expression is underpinned by the 
following philosophical theories: (i) argument from truth; (ii) marketplace of ideas; (iii) 
argument from self-fulfilment; (iv) argument from democratic self-governance. This 
philosophical foundation is apparent, to varying degrees, within domestic jurisprudence 
and that of the ECtHR161. For instance, the House of Lords recognised the existence of 
all of these rationales in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Simms 162 , where Lord Steyn stated the often-repeated passage 163  that freedom of 
expression ‘serves a number of broad objectives’164. This section seeks to advance the 
proposition that the argument from democratic self-governance, as supported by the 
argument from self-fulfilment, is better suited than the argument from truth and the 
marketplace of ideas, to underpin new media, and provide a workable definition of the 
media as a constitutional component, that effectively delineates it from non-media 
actors. 
(B) THE ARGUMENT FROM TRUTH 
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The argument from truth is located in John Stuart Mill’s 19th Century essay Of the 
Liberty of Thought and Discussion165. Its overall thrust is that truth is most likely to 
emerge from totally uninhibited freedom of thought, and almost absolute freedom of 
expression166. Consequently, thought and discussion protects individual liberty from its 
predominant threat167, which is not ‘political oppression’168, but ‘social tyranny’169: a 
‘tyrannical majority’170 that does not allow for autonomous thought, expression or 
opposition, but instead requires absolute accord with its own ideas and opinions171.  
As will be seen below, in relation to the four facets of Mill’s argument, it is 
subject to a conflict between the discoverability of truth, and the constant need for 
disagreement about that truth 172 . Mill argues that truth does not, always and 
immediately triumph, but rather, that it will continually be subject to rediscovery, and 
will eventually emerge victorious, despite suppression173. 
According to Schauer, for Mill, the issue is not certain truth; instead, his primary 
concern is ‘epistemic advance’174. Indeed, Mill regards truth, at times, as merely a by-
product of open discussion 175 . Thus, of paramount importance to Mill is not the 
discovery of truth, but the process of discussion and debate176. Mill argues that the 
foundations and reasoning upon which opinions are based must be continually tested 
and, as result, the acceptance of alternative views by others, and ultimately the reliable 
discovery of truth, must derive from effective persuasion, rather than coercion177.  
The argument has four facets. Firstly, the state would expose its own fallibility 
if it suppresses opinion on account of that opinion’s perceived falsity as, in fact, it may 
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be true178. Secondly, even if the suppressed opinion is objectively false, it has some 
value, as it may (and in Mill’s opinion very commonly does) contain an element of 
truth179. Thirdly, since the dominant opinion on any given subject is rarely, or never, 
the whole truth, what remains will only appear as a result of the collision of adverse 
opinions180. Finally, notwithstanding the third facet, even if the received opinion is not 
only true, but the entire truth, unless it is rigorously discussed and debated, it will not 
carry the same weight, as the rationale behind it may not be fully and accurately 
comprehended 181 . Consequently, unless opinions can be frequently and freely 
challenged, by forcing those holding them to defend their views, the very meaning and 
essence of that true belief may, itself, be weakened, become ineffective, or even lost182. 
In Mill’s words, the true belief: ‘will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth’183.  
Mill values open discussion and debate instrumentally and intrinsically184, and 
argues that there should be: ‘freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical 
or speculative, scientific, moral or theological’185. Accordingly, the very existence of 
disagreement is critical to the health of society186 and the type or quality of expression 
is irrelevant, as the ‘usefulness of an opinion is itself a matter of opinion’ and to make 
an assessment of quality is an ‘assumption of infallibility’187. Thus, it appears that Mill 
envisaged the argument to apply to the expression of opinion and debate.  
Despite Schauer’s argument that the desirability of truth within society is almost 
universally accepted188, and the fact that this view seems to correlate with Jacob LJ’s 
dicta in L’Oreal SA v Bellure NV189 that, pursuant to various international laws190, ‘the 
right to tell – and to hear – the truth has high international recognition’ 191 , the 
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assumption derived from the argument, that freedom of expression leads to truth, can 
be attacked on a number of fronts192. Firstly, there is not necessarily a causal link 
between freedom of expression and the discovery of truth 193 . This is particularly 
pertinent with regard to the new media landscape, where anybody can express opinions 
or views, or disseminate information. Consequently, new media outlets are saturated 
with information that is inaccurate, misleading or untrue. Secondly, despite Jacob LJ’s 
dicta, there is no right to truth per se194. Further, contrary to Schauer’s statement, 
arguably the dissemination of truth is not always a good thing. In some situations, the 
protection of other, countervailing values, should take precedent. Ironically, this is 
illustrated by the international instruments referred to by Jacob LJ in L’Oreal. Taking 
the ECHR as an example, Article 10(1) is qualified by Article 10(2), which enables 
expression, and therefore both truths and untruths, to be legitimately withheld on 
grounds of, inter alia, health or morals, national security, public safety, protecting the 
reputation and honour of private individuals, the prevention of disorder or crime and 
breach of confidence. Equally, this can be applied to trade secrets, medical information, 
data protection, confidentiality agreements, or official secrecy. Within the context of 
new media, the revenge porn phenomenon illustrates this dichotomy. This new offence, 
which exists by virtue of section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, was 
essentially created to combat individuals sharing, via text messages and social media, 
sexually explicit content of ex-partners without that person’s permission195. Although 
the explicit pictures, videos and accompanying text may well be ‘true’, the 
dissemination of this content could, clearly, harm the victim’s health and morals, their 
reputation and honour and be a misuse of private information196. Thus, as Barendt 
argues: ‘[i]t is not inconsistent to defend a ban on the publication of propositions on the 
ground that their propagation would seriously damage society, while conceding that 
they might be true.’197 
(C) THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
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This theory originates from the jurisprudence of US judges. Although it is a distinct 
theory, it is generally regarded as deriving from Mill’s argument from truth. The theory 
emanates from Justice Holmes judgment in Abrams v United States198, in which it was 
asserted that: ‘the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market.’199 Subsequently, Holmes J’s judgment garnered support 
from other influential judges, including: Justice Brandeis in Whitney v California200; 
Justice Hand in United States v Dennis201 and International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers v NLRB202; and Justice Frankfurter in Dennis v United States203. According to 
the theory, an open and unregulated market, which allows for ideas to be traded through 
the free expression of all opinions, is most likely to lead to the truth and, consequently, 
increased knowledge 204 . Therefore, the examination of an opinion within the 
marketplace subjects it to a test that is more reliable than individual or governmental 
appraisal205. 
 One interpretation of the theory is that discovering truth is dependent upon 
unregulated competition in the actual, as opposed to ideal marketplace 206 . To the 
contrary, it is arguable that it is grounded in relativism, in that the ideas that emanate 
from the competitive market are the truth, leaving nothing more to be said207. Oster 
relies heavily upon this rationale to distinguish media from non-media actors208. In his 
view, because of the media’s power and ability to communicate via multiple channels, 
the theory dictates that the media should be subject to protection and only minimal 
restriction. This is because this privilege for journalists encourages the dissemination 
of more information that, sequentially, generates more valuable, truthful information209. 
However, this reasoning is flawed, in that it is the very reasons used by Oster to support 
his approach that renders the theory unsuitable to that which it has been applied. Indeed, 
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according to Barendt, whatever interpretation is adopted, the theory ‘rests on shaky 
grounds’210 for reasons that can be applied to both traditional and new media211.  
Firstly, if the assertion that one statement is stronger than another (whether these 
statements are communicated via a tweet, or a post on Facebook or YouTube, or 
whether they are printed in a traditional newspaper) cannot be intellectually supported 
and defended, the notion of truth loses its integrity 212 , as history demonstrates: 
falsehood frequently triumphs over truth, to the detriment of society213. Secondly, the 
theory assumes that recipients of the communication consider what they read or view 
within the context of the marketplace rationally; deciding whether to accept or reject it, 
based on whether it will improve their lifestyle, and society generally 214 . This 
assumption is unrealistic, and over-optimistic215. Both criticisms are pertinent to new 
media, which proliferates a huge amount of information that is poorly researched or 
simply untrue, yet has the potential to, and very often does, emerge as the dominant 
view216 regardless of the detrimental impact this may have on society. Thirdly, and of 
particular relevance to the traditional media, insofar as this theory relates to truth 
discovery, its integrity is contingent upon the sincerity and truthfulness of the speaker, 
and therefore assumes that the marketplace contains expression that solely represents 
the views of the proponents of, for instance, publications or broadcasts, as opposed to 
being conveyed on the basis of restrictions such as editorial control, ownership, political 
bias or increased commercial revenue through advertising and/or sales217. This may be 
true within the context of new media, where there are, in theory at least, less restrictions. 
Although this is not always the case, as many bloggers may simply regurgitate false, 
bias or misleading information218. In relation to the traditional media, this assumption 
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is unrealistic, as many media outlets are driven by these restrictions, to the detriment of 
investigative journalism219. 
(D) THE ARGUMENT FROM SELF-FULFILMENT 
Endorsement of this argument as a justification for freedom of expression of broad 
application220 can be found in the jurisprudence of a number of jurisdictions. In Simms, 
Lord Steyn stated that freedom of expression ‘…promotes the self-fulfilment of 
individuals in society’221; in Handyside v United Kingdom the ECtHR considered that 
the right is ‘one of the basic conditions…for the development of man’222; Thurgood 
Marshall J, in the US Supreme Court case of Procunier v Martinez held that it ‘…serves 
not only the needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit – a spirit that demands 
self-expression’223.  
The argument is based on the individual liberty paradigm; that individuals must 
be able to express themselves224. Pursuant to this theory, freedom of expression is 
afforded protection, as it is integral to an individual’s need for self-fulfilment and 
development 225 . Contrarily, suppression of expression is an affront to personal 
dignity226, as this undermines equality of respect afforded to individuals to exercise 
their moral powers of reason and rationality227. Consequently, if expression contributes 
to the speaker’s values and visions, it should be subject to protection228.  
Scholars such as Nimmer, Nestler and Fargo and Alexander argue that media 
expression, by virtue of constitutional functions, is far less significant under this 
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rationale compared with the argument from democratic self-governance229. This is 
because, pursuant to this argument, freedom of expression emanates from the role of 
the speaker, not the speaker’s impact on society230. While a professional or citizen 
journalist may claim personal gratification and fulfilment from their publications, this 
rationale does not apply to media companies, as these entities cannot be fulfilled 
through expression as a natural person can. Thus, media freedom is not inherently 
valuable on a personal level231. Instead, it is instrumentally and functionally valuable, 
as it protects individuals and legal persons fulfilling a constitutional role for society, 
rather than protecting expression for expression’s sake. 
However, to the contrary, within the context of new media, there is value within 
the argument, and the concept of individual autonomy, as they are inextricably linked 
to the argument from democratic self-governance, which it is argued below, underpins 
the media-as-a-constitutional-component concept for delineating media and non-media 
actors.  
According to Schauer, self-fulfilment and autonomy are interrelated232. The 
individual autonomy concept was first advanced by Thomas Scanlon. It is based on a 
right to receive information, and a right to be free from governmental intrusion into the 
process of individual decision-making233. In contrast to the arguments advanced by 
Nimmer et al, arguably, new media, and in particular social media, is better able to 
facilitate the free flow of information, at liberty from governmental and other 
constraints, compared to the traditional media, and can therefore aid the process of 
individual choice. Thus, the argument from self-fulfilment and the concept of autonomy 
play a role in distinguishing media from non-media actors, as they provide a premise 
for individuals to engage more fully with the democratic process and issues of public 
concern. As Schauer argues: ‘…it emphasizes freedom of speech as a principle 
embedded in a line of demarcation between the individual and the government’234. As 
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a result, it shares characteristics with valuable features of the argument from democratic 
self-governance235. 
(E) THE ARGUMENT FROM DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNANCE 
This argument is the most fashionable of the justifications in Western democracies236 
and is best suited to underpin new media and support the notion of the media-as-a-
constitutional component. It is based on the premise that the predominant purpose of 
freedom of expression is to protect the right of citizens to understand political matters 
in order to facilitate and enable societal engagement with the political and democratic 
process 237 . Ultimately, an informed electorate is a prerequisite of democracy. 
Therefore, ‘there must be no constraints on the free flow of information and ideas’238. 
According to Bork, speech regarding ‘government behaviour, policy or personnel, 
whether…executive, legislative, judicial or administrative’239 was the original subject 
that was perceived as being protected by the right to freedom of expression 240 . 
However, the scope of this approach was seen as being overly restrictive241, as focusing 
purely on political expression to the exclusion of other matters of public interest gave 
rise to an ‘old-fashioned distinction between public and private power’ 242 . 
Consequently, Alexander Meiklejohn, with whom this argument is now primarily 
associated243, argued for the substitution of political expression with the wider, and less 
restrictive notion of ‘public discussion’, relating to any matter of public interest, as 
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opposed to expression linked purely to the casting of votes244. Meiklejohn stated that 
public discussion is speech which impacts ‘directly or indirectly, upon the issues with 
which voters have to deal [i.e.] to matters of public interest’ 245 . A result of this 
bifurcated interpretation of free speech is a two-tiered approach to freedom of 
expression246: expression that is not in the interest of the public, is not protected, and is 
therefore open to restriction to protect the general welfare of society 247 . In later 
writings, Meiklejohn clarified this wider view of ‘public discussion’, by stating that 
voting is merely the ‘external expression of a wide and diverse number of activities by 
means of which citizens attempt to meet the responsibilities of making judgments’248. 
Accordingly, education, philosophy and science, literature and the arts, and public 
discussions on public issues, are activities that will educate citizens for self-
government249. 
 Historically, due to its reach, it was incumbent upon the traditional media to 
disseminate matters of public interest, and to act as the public watchdog and Fourth 
Estate; to provide a check and balance on government. Consequently, the ECtHR has 
consistently stated that media freedom provides one of the best means for the public to 
discover and form opinions about the ideas and attitudes of political leaders, and on 
other matters of general interest, and that the public has a right to receive this 
information250. However, this role can now be fulfilled by both the traditional media 
and, by virtue of new media, citizen journalists. Therefore, this argument helps to define 
the media by providing a clear delineation between media and non-media actors. 
Pursuant to its ‘public discussion’ scope, this rationale underpins the media-as-a-
constitutional-component concept, as it supports media freedom protection, beyond that 
afforded to private individuals pursuant to the right to freedom of expression, for any 
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actor that contributes regularly and widely to the dissemination of matters of public 
interest and/or operates as a public watchdog. 
(F) MEDIA PRIVILEGE AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The prevailing sections have established that media freedom grants protection beyond 
that afforded by freedom of expression to media actors fulfilling the media-as-a-
constitutional-component concept. However, media that, pursuant to this concept, is 
subject to these privileges, beyond private individuals, is also subject to duties and 
responsibilities in excess of those expected of non-media entities. As has been 
discussed throughout this article, the reach of both the traditional and new media, 
including citizen journalists, does not just enable it to fulfil its constitutional functions. 
This power can be abused in equal measure. Due to the reach of the media, the potential 
impact of abuse of power is far greater than those emanating from private individuals. 
The media is not just capable of invading private lives of individuals, or damaging 
reputations, but it can also shape and mislead public opinion.  
Therefore, the argument from democratic self-governance endorses a two-tiered 
approach to media expression 251 . Firstly, public discussion should be protected. 
However, if the expression is not of public interest, it should not be afforded the same 
level of protection compared to that which is of public concern. This includes speech 
primarily concerned with commercial or financial matters252, speech relating to private 
or intimate matters253, and hate speech254. Further, the argument from democratic self-
governance rationale, and its public discussion ambit, dictates that the media’s 
privileged protection, pursuant to it being a constitutional component, is subject to it 
acting ethically and in good faith, and publishing or broadcasting material that is based 
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jurisprudence, see: Lehideux and Isorni v France App no 55/1997/839/1045 (ECtHR, 23 September 
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on reasonable research to verify the provenance of it and its sources. Incidentally, the 
only legal instruments that qualify the right to free speech or expression with express 
reference to these extra duties and responsibilities are Article 10(2) ECHR and Article 
19(3) ICCPR. These qualification clauses apply to both media and non-media entities; 
however, according to Oster, their main purpose is to provide member states with a tool 
to combat abuses of power by the media255.  
Consequently, the privilege afforded to the media, deriving primarily from the 
wide ambit of the argument from democratic self-governance, is based upon a 
utilitarian, consequentialist and functional understanding of media freedom. The 
media-as-a-constitutional-component concept means that media actors are protected for 
disseminating matters of public interest, and operating as the public watchdog/Fourth 
estate, and therefore fulfilling functions beneficial to society. However, this protection 
carries with it the obligation to fulfil these functions. If it fails to do this, it relinquishes 
its protection and may be subject to criminal or civil liability. 
6 CONCLUSION: A NEW WORKABLE DEFINITION OF ‘THE MEDIA’  
The High Court of New Zealand’s decision in Slater v Blomfield256 determined that a 
blogger could be considered a journalist for the purposes of section 68 of the New 
Zealand Evidence Act 2006 provided, inter alia: ‘(i) the medium used by the journalist 
disseminates the information to the public or a section of the public; (ii) what is 
disseminated is news and observations on news; and (iii) the person claiming to be a 
journalist is a person who, in the normal course of that person’s work, might be given 
information by informants in the expectation that it will be published in a news 
medium’257. Consequently, in dealing with these points, Asher J’s judgment provides a 
number of guiding principles that can be applied to a new workable definition of media. 
Firstly, an actor can begin publishing as non-media, and later become media once a 
certain level of work and content is achieved258. Secondly, an actor that regularly 
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disseminates news to a significant body of the public can be a journalist259. Thirdly, just 
because an actor is a blogger/blog does not mean it cannot be considered as media. 
Indeed, ‘a blogger who regularly disseminates news to a significant body of the public 
can be a journalist’260. Fourthly, an actor that publishes a single news item would not 
qualify as media. Regular commitment to publishing new or recent information of 
public interest is required for, a blog for instance, to be considered news media. 
However, the quantity of stories does not have to be equivalent to a corporate news 
organisation261. Finally, to determine whether an actor’s work within the context of the 
medium makes them media, the following factors are relevant: (i) whether the receiving 
and disseminating of news through a news medium is regular; (ii) whether it involved 
significant time on a frequent basis; (iii) whether there was revenue derived from the 
medium; and (iv) whether it involved the application of journalistic skill262. 
Based on the media-as-a-constitutional-component concept of media freedom 
that has been advanced throughout this article, it is suggested that an egalitarian 
principle should be adopted to define the media. This principle and its definition will 
focus on the functions that are performed by the media actors, as opposed to their 
inherent characteristics. Therefore, media freedom does not have to be a purely 
institutional privilege; it can apply to any actor that conforms to the definition. As a 
consequence of the requirement that these functions are fulfilled in order to satisfy the 
constitutional component concept, it will also give consideration to the obligations of 
the media. By applying the guidelines laid down in Slater, and scholarship and 
jurisprudence from both the US and Europe263, examined in prevailing sections, the 
following definition of media is proposed: (1) a natural and legal person (2) engaged in 
the process of gathering information of public concern, interest and significance (3) 
with the intention, and for the purpose of, disseminating this information to a section 
of the public on a regular basis (4) whilst complying with objective standards governing 
the research, newsgathering and editorial process. These standards would include, for 
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instance, the time spent researching stories and ensuring the provenance and reliability 
of information. 
 As the media’s privileged protection is based upon the constitutional component 
concept, which derives from the argument from democratic self-governance, one of the 
fundamental requirements for determining that an actor is operating as part of the media 
is its contribution to matters of public interest. Oster’s argument that for this 
requirement to be fulfilled it must occur periodically264 is over-exclusive. Actors can 
fulfil the definition above, and operate as a constitutional component, on one-off 
occasions or on an ad-hoc basis265. This is particularly the case within a new media 
context, in which contributions to the public interest can be made via many different 
platforms.  
 Scholarship and jurisprudence from the US, England and Wales and the ECtHR 
suggests that this requirement could be met with differences of opinion. From a US 
scholarship perspective, it is likely to be opposed on a doctrinal basis, as content 
discrimination is not permitted under the First Amendment266. To the contrary however, 
according to Sunstein: ‘…it would be difficult to imagine a sensible system of free 
expression that did not distinguish among categories of speech in accordance with their 
importance to the underlying purposes of the free speech guarantee’267. Indeed, the US 
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada and the Court of Appeal, House of Lords 
and Supreme Court have made consistent reference to the public interest requirement. 
The courts have expressed this in a number of ways, including: ‘public interest’ or 
‘public concern’ 268 ; ‘of political, social or other concern to the community’ 269 ; 
‘influences social relations and politics on a grand scale’; or is part of a ‘debate about 
public affairs’; makes a ‘contribution to the public debate’; stimulating ‘political and 
                                                             
264 ibid. (Oster)  74. 
265 Editions Plon v France App no 58148/00 (ECtHR 18 May 2004) para. 43; Lindon, Otchakovsky-
Laurens and July v France App no 21279/02 and 36448/02 (ECtHR 22 October 2007) para. 47. 
266 L.L. Berger, ‘Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to Protect the Journalist’s 
Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication’ (2003) 39 Houston Law Review 1371, 1411; Baker, 
above n 143, 976. 
267 C.R. Sunstein, ‘Pornography and the First Amendment’ (1986) 35 Duke Law Journal 589, 605. 
268 For example see: Gertz v Robert Welch Inc 418 US 323, 246 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet Inc v 
Greenmoss Builders 472 US 749, 761 (1985); Hustler Magazine v Falwell 485 US 46, 50 (1988); 
Bartnicki v Vopper 532 US 514, 528, 533-534 (2001); London Artists v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375, 391 
(CA) (per Lord Denning); Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127, 205 (per Lord Nicholls); 
Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2007] 1 AC 359, 376 (per Lord Bingham); Flood v Times 
Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 11, [24] (per Lord Phillips). 
269 Connick v Myers 461 US 138, 146 (1983). 
 36 
social changes’270; more than 'mere curiosity or prurient interest' with the public having 
a 'genuine stake in knowing about the matter published'271. Similarly, the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence provides rich precedent supporting the public interest requirement. It has 
regularly referred to ‘matters of general public interest’ and ‘matters of public concern’ 
within a variety of different circumstances. The principle has been applied to, amongst 
many other things272: national and local level political speech and reporting273; criticism 
of public administration and justice 274 ; abuse of police power 275 ; criticisms of 
businesses and those operating businesses 276 . Hence, according to the ECtHR, 
publishing material relating exclusively to private matters or on ‘tawdry allegations’ 
and ‘sensational and…lurid news, intended to titillate and entertain, which are aimed 
at satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership regarding aspects of a person’s 
strictly private life’ and serving to entertain rather than educate is not in the public 
interest277.  
These situations referred to by the ECtHR relate to mere entertainment, as 
opposed to the fulfilment of a constitutional function pursuant to the media-as-a-
constitutional-component and the proposed definition. In such situations, a publisher is 
not fulfilling their constitutional function, or role as public watchdog within a 
democracy. Consequently, they should not be subject to the privileges attached to media 
freedom. Thus, this proposed definition of the media has the potential to exclude from 
media privileges actors that have, traditionally, been considered part of the media, and 
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subject to the protection offered by media freedom, despite their purpose being to 
primarily treat ‘the private lives of those in the public eye’ as ‘a highly lucrative 
commodity’ by exposing aspects of people’s private lives or engaging in entertainment 
and sensationalism. These actors and entities do not conform to the requirements of the 
definition by publishing material that contributes to the dissemination of matters of 
public interest. 
  
 
